Chapter 1 Political Science: The Discipline

Robert E. Goodin

Hans-Dieter Klingemann

Retrospectives are, by their nature, inherently selective. Many fascinating observations are contained within the wide-ranging surveys which constitute the New Handbook of Political Science. Many more emerge from reading across all of its chapters, collectively. But, inevitably, the coverage is incomplete and, equally inevitably, somewhat idiosyncratic. All authors are forced to leave out much of merit, often simply because it does not fit their chosen narrative structure. The New Handbook's contributors tell a large part of the story of what has been happening in political science in the last two decades, but none would pretend to have told the whole story.

It is the task of this introductory chapter to set those chapters in a larger disciplinary context and to pull out some of their more interesting common threads. Just as the coverage of each of the following chapters is inevitably selective, that of this overview of the overviews is, inevitably, all the more so. Of the several themes and subthemes which emerge, looking across these chapters as a whole, we shall focus upon one in particular.

The New Handbook provides striking evidence of the professional maturation of political science as a discipline. This development has two sides to it. On the one side, there is increasing differentiation, with more and more sophisticated work being done within subdisciplines (and, indeed, within sub-specialities within subdisciplines). On the other side, there is increasing integration across all the separate subdisciplines.

Of the two, increasing differentiation and specialization is the more familiar story, integration the more surprising one. But clearly it is the case that there is, nowadays, an increasing openness to and curiosity about what is happening in adjacent subdisciplines. An increasingly shared

overarching intellectual agenda across most all of the subdisciplines makes it possible for theoretical innovations to travel across subdisciplinary boundaries. An increasingly shared methodological tool-kit makes such interchange easy. All of this is facilitated, in turn, by an increasing band of synthesizers of the discipline, often intellectually firmly rooted in one particular subdiscipline but capable of speaking to many subdisciplines in terms which they find powerfully engaging. Among the many things which strike us, reading across the chapters of the New Handbook as a whole, these are the ones that strike us most forcefully and which we will elaborate upon in this chapter.

I Political Science as a Discipline

A central claim of this chapter is that political science, as a discipline, has become increasingly mature and professionalized.[1] As an important preliminary to that discussion, we must address, necessarily briefly, a few threshold questions. What is it for political science to constitute a discipline? What is politics? In what sense can the study of politics aspire to the status of a science?

A The Nature of a Discipline

Inured as we are to speaking of the subdivisions of academic learning as "disciplines," it pays to reflect upon the broader implications of that phrase. According to the Concise Oxford English Dictionary a discipline is variously defined as: "a branch of instruction; mental and moral training, adversity as effecting this; military training, drill . . . ; order maintained among schoolboys, soldiers, prisoners, etc.; system of rules for conduct; control exercised over members of church; chastisement; (Ecclesiastical) mortification by penance."

The last dictionary definition would seem to have only marginal application to academic disciplines, but most of the others have clear counterparts. An academic "discipline" may enjoy minimal scope to "punish," at least in the most literal senses (Foucault 1977). Still, the community of

[1] Once "professionalized" might have equated, readily and narrowly, to "Americanized." But as alluded to in our Preface and as is evident from New Handbook contributors' affiliations, the profession itself is becoming more internationalized, both in its personnel and in its professional concerns.

scholars which collectively constitutes a discipline does exercise a strict supervisory function—both over those working within it and, most especially, over those aspiring to do so. The "order maintained" is not quite the same as that over soldiers or schoolboys, nor is the training strictly akin to military drill. Nonetheless, there is a strong sense (shifting over time) of what is and what is not "good" work within the discipline, and there is a certain amount of almost rote learning involved in "mastering" a discipline.

All the standard terms used to describe academic disciplines hark back to much the same imagery. Many, for example, prefer to think of political analysis as more of an "art" or "craft" than a "science," strictly speaking (Wildavsky 1979). But on that analogy the craft of politics can then only be mastered in the same manner in which all craft knowledge is acquired, by apprenticing oneself (in academic craftwork, "studying under") a recognized "master." Others like to speak of politics, as well as the academic study thereof, as a "vocation" (Weber 1919/1946) or a "calling".[2] But, tellingly, it is a vocation rather than an avocation, a job rather than a hobby; and as in the core religious meaning so too in the academic one, the "calling" in question is to service of some higher power (be it an academic community or the Lord). Most of us, finally, talk of academic disciplines as "professions." In Dwight Waldo's (1975: 123) delightful phrase "sciences know, professions profess." What scientists profess, however, are articles of the collective faith.

Any way we look at them, then, disciplines are construed at least in large part as stern taskmasters. But the same received disciplinary traditions and practices which so powerfully mould and constrain us are at one and the same time powerfully enabling. The framework provided by the structure of a discipline's traditions both focuses research and facilitates collaboration, unintentional as well as intentional. A shared disciplinary framework makes it possible for mere journeymen to stand, productively, on the shoulders of giants. It also makes it possible for giants to build, productively, on the contributions of legions of more ordinarily gifted practitioners.[3]

Discipline, academic or otherwise, is thus a classic instance of a useful self-binding mechanism. Subjecting oneself to the discipline of a discipline—or in the case of Dogan's (below: chap. 3) hybrid scholars, of several—is conducive to more and indisputably better work, both individually

[2] Both Berger's Invitation to Sociology (1963) and Medawar's Advice to a Young Scientist (1989: esp. chap. 2) verge on this. Much the finest work in this genre remains F. M. Cornford's justly celebrated Microcosmographia Academia (1908).

[3] For powerful evidence of the way that certain discoveries are "on the cards" at some point in time, consider the cases of "multiple discoveries" discussed in Merton (1973).

and collectively. That is as true for the “chiefs” as the “indians” of the discipline, as true for the “Young Turks” as the “greybeards.”

Branches of academic learning are “professions” as well as disciplines. “Professional” connotes, first of all, a relatively high-status occupational grade; and the organization of national and international “professional associations” doubtless has to do, in no small part, with securing the status and indeed salaries of academics thus organized. But the term “professional” also, and more importantly, indicates a certain attitude toward one's work. A profession is a self-organizing community, oriented toward certain well-defined tasks or functions. A professional community is characterized by, and to a large extent defined in terms of, certain self-imposed standards and norms. Incoming members of the profession are socialized into those standards and norms, ongoing members are evaluated in terms of them. These professional standards and norms not only form the basis for evaluation of professionals by one another; they are “internalized,” with professionals themselves taking a “critical reflective attitude” toward their own performances in light of them.[4]

The specific standards and norms vary from profession to profession, of course. But across all professions there is a sense of “minimal professional competence,” captured by the ritual of “qualifying examinations” for intending political scientists in North American post-graduate training programs. And across all professions there is a notion of particular “role responsibilities” attaching to membership in a profession. The professional ethics of academics do not touch on issues of life and death in quite the same way as those of doctors or lawyers, perhaps. But virtually all academic professions have increasingly formal codes of ethics, touching largely on matters to do with integrity in the conduct and promulgation of research; and all professionals are expected to adhere to them faithfully (APSA 1991).

One of our themes in this chapter is the increasing “professionalism within political science as a whole. By this we mean, firstly, that there is increasing agreement to a “common core” which can be taken to define “minimal professional competence” within the profession. Secondly, there is an increasing tendency to judge work, one's own even more than others', in terms of increasingly high standards of professional excellence.

While the minimal standards are largely shared ones, the higher aspirations are many and varied. But as in medicine so too in political science, each sub-speciality within the larger profession has its own internal standards

[4] In much the same way Hart (1961) depicts the norms of legal systems, more generally, being internalized. On the nature of professions and members orientation toward them, see Hughes (1958) and Parsons (1968).

of excellence, by which each member of that fraction of the profession is properly judged. And in political science just as in medicine, there is some broad sense across the profession as a whole as to how all the subspecialities sit together to form a coherent larger whole.

B What Is Politics?

The foregoing observations, by and large, pertain to academic disciplines quite generally. Disciplines are differentiated one from another in many ways, principally among them by their substantive concerns and by the methodologies that they have made their own. Although there are, as we shall argue, a number of useful "tricks" in political science's tool-kit which are shared by most members of most of its subdisciplines, Alker (below: chap. 35) is undeniably correct in saying that political science does not have—much less define itself in terms of—a single big methodological device all its own, the way that many disciplines do. Rather, political science as a discipline is defined by its substantive concerns, by its fixation on "politics" in all its myriad forms.

"Politics" might best be characterized as the constrained use of social power. Following on from that, the study of politics—whether by academics or practical politicians—might be characterized, in turn, as the study of the nature and source of those constraints and the techniques for the use of social power within those constraints.[5]

When defining politics in terms of power, we follow many before us.[6] "Power" is, by now, well known to be a fraught conceptual field.[7] Respectful though we are of its complexities, we decline to let ourselves get bogged down in them. Dahl's (1957) old neo-Weberian definition still serves well enough. In those terms, X has power over Y insofar as: (i) X is able, in one way or another, to get Y to do something (ii) that is more to X's liking, and (iii) which Y would not otherwise have done.

Where our analysis departs from tradition is in defining politics in terms of the constrained use of power. To our way of thinking, unconstrained power is force, pure and simple. It is not a political power play at all, except perhaps in some degenerate, limiting-case sense. Pure force, literally

5 This in turn gives rise to the dual foci of the discipline, identified by Almond (below: chap. 2), on "the properties of political institutions and the criteria we use to evaluate them."

6 Notable among them: Weber (1922/1978); Lasswell (1950; Lasswell and Kaplan 1950), Dahl (1963) and Duverger (1964 /1966). We, like them, focus specifically on "social" power, the power of people over other people.

7 To classic texts such as Russell (1938), Jouvenel (1945/1948) and Dahl (1957; 1961b; 1963) have recently been added Lukes (1974), Barry (1989: esp. chaps. 8–11) and Morriss (1987).

speaking, is more the province of physics (or its social analogues: military science and the martial arts) than of politics.[8] It is the constraints under which political actors operate, and strategic maneuvering that they occasion and that occurs within them, that seems to us to constitute the essence of politics.[9] It is the analysis of those constraints—where they come from, how they operate, how political agents might operate within them—that seems to us to lie at the heart of the study of politics.[10]

We talk, broadly, about the use of social power (rather than, more narrowly, about its "exercise") as a gesture toward the multitude of ways in which political agents might maneuver within such constraints. We mean the term to cover intentional acts as well as unintended consequences of purposeful action (Merton 1936). We mean it to cover covert manipulatory politics as well as overt power plays (Schattschneider 1960; Goodin 1980; Riker 1986). We mean it to cover passive as well as active workings of power, internalized norms as well as external threats (Bachrach and Baratz 1963; Lukes 1974). The infamous "law of anticipated reactions," non-decisions and the hegemonic shaping of people's preferences (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) must all be accommodated in any decently expansive sense of the political.

One further comment on concepts. In defining politics (and the study of it) as we do, we explicitly depart from the purely distributional tradition of Lasswell's (1950) classic formulation of "politics" as "who gets what, when and how."[11] Perhaps it is true that all political acts ultimately have distributional consequences; and perhaps it is even true that therein lies most of our interest in the phenomenon. But in terms of the meaning of the act to the actor, many political acts are at least in the first instance distinctly non-distributional. And even in the final analysis, much of the social significance—objective as well as subjective—of certain political interactions might never be reducible to crass questions of dividing up the social pie. Distributive, regulative, redistributive (Lowi 1964) and identity (Sandel 1982) politics may all have their own distinctive styles.

[8] Thus, an absolute dictator in quest of complete, unconstrained power would rightly be said to be engaged in an (inevitably futile) attempt to transcend politics.

[9] Consider the following analogy drawn from a cognate discipline. Philosophers talk in terms of "strong" considerations, "compelling" arguments, and such like (Nozick 1981: 4–6). But consider an argument such that if we did believe it we would die: that is about as compelling as an argument can get; but winning a point by means of such an argument seems the antithesis of real philosophical disputation, the essence of which is give-and-take. By the same token, the very essence of politics is strategic maneuvering (Riker 1986); and irresistible forces, insofar as they leave no scope for such maneuvering, are the antithesis of politics (however successful they are at getting others to do what you want).

[10] In saying this, we are following (loosely) Crick 1962.

[11] Or Easton's (1965) of politics as the authoritative allocation of values—at least insofar as that is construed, first and foremost, as a matter of the allocation of "valued things" in a society.

Distributional struggles are characterized, in welfare economists' terms, as squabbles over where we sit on the Paretian frontier; but getting to the Paretian frontier is itself a tricky problem, involving a lot of politicking of quite a different sort which is often distinctively non-distributional, at least in the first instance. Important though it undeniably is that our understanding of politics should be attuned to distributive struggles, then, it is equally important that it not be committed in advance to analyzing all else exclusively in terms of them.

C The Several Sciences of Politics

Much ink has been spilt over the question of whether, or in what sense, the study of politics is or is not truly a science. The answer largely depends upon how much one tries to load into the term “science.” We prefer a minimalist definition of science as being just “systematic enquiry, building toward an ever more highly-differentiated set of ordered propositions about the empirical world.”[12] In those deliberately spartan terms, there is little reason to think that the study of politics cannot aspire to be scientific.

Many, of course, mean much more than that by the term. A logical positivist might cast the aspirations of science in terms of finding some set of “covering laws” so strong that even a single counter-example would suffice to falsify them. Clearly, that sets the aspirations of science much too high ever to be attained in the study of politics. The truths of political science, systematic though they may be, are and seem inevitably destined to remain essentially probabilistic in form. The “always” and “never” of the logical positivist's covering laws find no purchase in the political world, where things are only ever “more or less likely” to happen.

The reason is not merely that our explanatory model is incomplete, not merely that there are other factors in play which we have not yet managed to factor in. That will inevitably be true, too, of course. But the deeper source of such errors in the positivist model of political science lies in a misconstrual of the nature of its subject. A covering law model may (or may not: that is another issue) work well enough for billiard balls subject to the sorts of forces presupposed by models of Newtonian mechanics: there all actions can be said to be caused, and the causes can be exhaustively traced to forces acting externally upon the “actors.” But human beings, while they are undeniably subject to certain causal forces as well, are also in

[12] After the fashion of the older Wissenschaft traditions of the German universities from which 19th-century Americans imported political science into their own country (Waldo 1975: 25–30)—and to which contemporary “policy scientists” are now harking back (Rivlin 1971).

part intentional actors, capable of cognition and of acting on the basis of it. “Belief,” “purpose,” “intention,” “meaning” are all potentially crucial elements in explaining the actions of humans, in a way that they are not in explaining the “actions” of a billiard ball. The subjects of study in politics, as in all the social sciences, have an ontological status importantly different from that of billiard balls; and that, in turn, makes the logical positivist's covering law model deeply inappropriate for them, in a way it would not be for billiard balls themselves.[13]

To say that scientific understanding in politics must crucially include a component relating to the meaning of the act to the actor is not, however, necessarily to deny political science appropriate access to all the accoutrements of science. Mathematical modelling and statistical testing remain as useful as ever.[14] The interpretation of the results is all that has to change. What we are picking up with those tools are seen, now, not as inexorable workings of external forces on passive actors, but rather as common or conventional responses of similar people in similar plights. Conventions can change, and circumstances all the more, so the truths thereby uncovered are less “universal” perhaps than those of Newtonian physics. But since we can, in like fashion, aspire to model (more or less completely) changes in conventions and circumstances themselves, we might eventually aspire to closure even in this more amorphous branch of science.

II The Maturation of the Profession

What the New Handbook's chapters taken together most strongly suggest is the growing maturity of political science as a discipline. Whether or not “progress” has been made, after the optimistic fashion of Gabriel Almond (below: chap. 2), is perhaps another matter. But maturity, understood in ordinary developmental terms of a growing capacity to see things from the other's point of view, does indeed seem to have been substantially achieved across most quarters of the discipline.

It was not always so. The “behavioral revolution,” in its heyday, was from many perspectives a thoroughly Jacobin affair; and it would hardly be

[13] For good surveys of these issues, see Hollis (1977), Taylor (1985) and, with specific reference to politics, Moon (1975) and Almond and Genco (1977). Post-positivist sensitivity to such hermeneutic concerns is much in evidence across many chapters of the New Handbook, as discussed in Sect. IIIC below.

[14] Indeed, some of the most highly mathematical developments in recent political science have come in elaboration of the “rational actor” model; and the basic forces driving those models are the rational choice of individuals themselves rather than any causal forces acting externally upon them.

pressing the analogy too far to say that the reaction was decidedly Thermidorian to boot. Early behavioral revolutionaries, for their part, were devoted to dismissing the formalisms of politics—institutions, organizational charts, constitutional myths and legal fictions—as pure sham. Those whom the behavioral revolution left behind, just as those who would later try to leave it behind in turn, heaped Olympian scorn upon the scientific pretensions of the new discipline, calling down the wisdom of sages and of the ages.[15]

A generation later, the scenario replayed itself with "rational choice" revolutionaries imposing formal order and mathematical rigor upon loose logic borrowed by behavioralists from psychology. Once again, the struggle assumed a Manichean Good-versus-Evil form. No halfway houses were to be tolerated. In the name of theoretical integrity and parsimony, rational choice modellers strove (at least initially) to reduce all politics to the interplay of narrow material self-interest—squeezing out, in the process, people's values and principles and personal attachments as well as a people's history and institutions.[16] In the rational choice just as in the behavioral revolution, many famous victories were scored (Popkin et al. 1976). But while much was gained, much was also lost.

In contrast to both those revolutionary moments, we now seem to be solidly in a period of rapprochement. The single most significant contribution toward that rapprochement, running across a great many of the following chapters, is the rise of the "new institutionalism." Political scientists no longer think in the either/or terms of agency or structure, interests or institutions as the driving forces: now, virtually all serious students of the discipline would say it is a matter of a judicious blend of both (Rothstein below: chap. 5; Weingast below: chap. 6; Majone below: chap. 26; Alt and Alesina below: chap. 28; Offe below: chap. 29). Political scientists no longer think in the either/or terms of behavioral propensities or organization charts: again, virtually all serious students would now say it is a matter of analyzing behavior within the parameters set by institutional facts and

[15] Sober statements of the behavioralist agenda can be culled from Dahl (1961a) and Ranney (1962). Judicious statements of the institutionalist reaction are found in Ridley (1975) and Johnson (1989), with the more philosophical wing of the anti-scientific reaction being perhaps best represented by Oakeshott (1951/1956) and Stretton (1969). For "post-behavioralist" statements, see particularly Wolin (1960), McCoy and Playford (1968) and Easton (1969); the philosophy-of-science face of this tendency is well represented in the Greenstein–Polsby Handbook by a singularly judicious chapter from Moon (1975).

[16] Classic early manifestos include Mitchell (1969) and Riker and Ordeshook (1973). The criticisms here canvassed in the text come from friendly critics (Goodin 1976; Sen 1977; North 1990), and refined rational choice models now regularly go some way (albeit perhaps not far enough—cf. Offe below: chap. 29) toward taking most of them on board (Kiewiet 1983; Mansbridge 1990; Monroe 1991).

opportunity structures (Pappi below: chap. 9; Dunleavy below: chap. 10). Political scientists no longer think in the either/or terms of rationality or habituation: virtually all serious rational choice modellers now appreciate the constraints under which real people take political actions, and incorporate within their own models many of the sorts of cognitive shortcuts that political psychologists have long been studying (Pappi below: chap. 9; Grofman below: chap. 30). Political scientists no longer think in the either/or terms of realism or idealism, interests or ideas as driving forces in history: virtually all serious students of the subject carve out a substantial role for both (Goldmann below: chap. 16; Sanders below: chap. 17; Keohane below: chap. 19; Nelson below: chap. 24; Majone below: chap. 26). Political scientists no longer think in either/or terms of science or story-telling, wide-ranging cross-national comparisons or carefully crafted case studies unique unto themselves: virtually all serious students of the subject now see the merit in attending to local detail and appreciate the possibilities of systematic, statistically compelling study even in small-N situations (Whitehead below: chap. 14; Ragin et al. below: chap. 33). Political scientists no longer think in either/or terms of history or science, mono-causality or hopeless complexity: even hard-bitten econometricians have now been forced to admit the virtues of estimation procedures which are sensitive to "path" effects (Jackson below: chap. 32), and simplistic early models of politico-economic interactions have now been greatly enriched (Hofferbert and Cingranelli below: chap. 25; Alt and Alesina below: chap. 28).

The point is not just that rapprochement has been achieved on all these fronts. What is more important is the way in which that has been achieved and the spirit pervading the discipline in its newly configured form. Although each scholar and faction would place the emphasis differently on the elements being combined, the point remains that the concessions have been made gladly rather than grudgingly. They have been made, not out of a "live and let live" pluralism, still less out of postmodern nihilism. Rather, concessions have been made and compromises struck in full knowledge of what is at stake, what alternatives are on offer and what combinations make sense.[17] The upshot is undoubtedly eclectic, but it is an ordered eclecticism rather than pure pastiche.

Political scientists of the present generation come, individually and collectively,

[17] Consider, for example, Fiorina's (1995) modus operandi: "I teach my students that rational choice models are most useful where stakes are high and numbers low, in recognition that it is not rational to go to the trouble to maximize if the consequences are trivial and/or your own actions make no difference . . . Thus, in work on mass behavior I utilize minimalist notions of rationality (Fiorina 1981: 83), whereas in work on elites I assume a higher order of rationality (Fiorina 1989: chaps. 5, 11)."

equipped with a richer tool-kit than their predecessors. Few of those trained at any of the major institutions from the 1970s forward will be unduly intimidated (or unduly impressed, either) by theories or techniques from behavioral psychology, empirical sociology or mathematical economics. Naturally, each will have his or her own predilections among them. But nowadays most will be perfectly conversant across all those methodological traditions, willing and able to borrow and steal, refute and repel, as the occasion requires.[18]

There are many ways of telling and retelling these disciplinary histories, with correspondingly many lessons for how to avoid the worst and achieve the best in the future. One way to tell the tale would be in terms of the rise and decline of the "guru." Unproductive periods in the prehistory of modern political science, just as in mid-century political philosophy, were characterized by gurus and their camp followers, the former engaging with one another minimally, the latter hardly at all.[19] These dialogues of the deaf are transformed into productive, collaborative engagements only once factional feuds have been displaced by some sense of a common enterprise and of some shared disciplinary concerns.[20]

Another lesson to draw from that tale concerns the bases upon which a sufficiently overlapping consensus is most likely for founding such a common enterprise. As in liberal politics itself (Rawls 1993), so too in the liberal arts more generally: a modus vivendi sufficient for productive collaboration is likely to emerge within an academic discipline only at lower levels of analysis and abstraction. It is sheer folly to seek to bully or cajole a diverse and dispersed community of scholars into an inevitably false and fragile consensus on foundational issues—whether cast in terms of the one true philosophy of science (logical positivism or its many alternatives) or in terms of the one true theory of society (structural-functionalism, systems theory, rational choice or whatever).

[18] Outstanding examples of such dexterity include Elster's (1983) Explaining Technical Change (1983) and Putnam's Making Democracy Work (1993). Elster and Putnam are uncommonly gifted practitioners of the art, emblematic, if not exactly representative, of political science at the turn of the century.

[19] Compare Dogan's (below: chap. 3) discussion of the "mutual disregard" among turn-of-the-century sociologists such as Durkheim, Weber, Töennies and Simmel and Waldo's (1975: 47–50) account of the ongoing wars between Chicago and Harvard in the 1930s with Parekh's (below: chap. 21) account of mid-century political philosophy.

[20] Indeed, judging from Warren Miller's (chap. 10 below) account, the early history of past break-throughs—in his case, the behavioral revolution—was similarly characterized by cross-disciplinary conversations of just this sort. One might say the same of the "public choice" movement, growing out of collaborations among public-finance economists (Buchanan, Olson), lawyers (Tullock), political scientists (Riker, Ostrom) and sociologists (Coleman)—to tell the subdiscipline's history just in terms of the early presidents of its peak body, the Public Choice Society. Testimony to the frustrating strength of subdisciplinary enclaves is found in Almond (1990) and Easton and Schelling (1991).

Endless disputation over foundations is as unnecessary as it is unproductive, however. The simple sharing of “nuts and bolts”—the building-blocks of science—goes a long way toward consolidating a shared sense of the discipline (Elster 1989). Tricks and tools and theories which were initially developed in one connection can, as often as not, be transposed into other settings—mutatis mutandis. Much mutation, adaptation and reinterpretation is, indeed, often required to render borrowed tools appropriate to their new uses. But the borrowing, cross-fertilization and hybridization, and the conceptual stretching which it imposes on both sides of the borrowing and lending relationship is what scientific progress today seems principally to be about (Dogan below: chap. 3).

Whether it is a “science,” strictly speaking, which has been achieved is an open question—and one best left as open, pending the ultimate resolution of interminable disputes among philosophers of science themselves over the “true” nature of science. But by the standards of the spartan definition of science we proposed in Section IC above—“systematic enquiry, building toward an ever more highly-differentiated set of ordered propositions about the empirical world”—our discipline has indeed become more scientific. Certainly it is now more highly differentiated, both in its own internal structure and in its propositions about the world.

It is yet another open question, however, whether the growth of science thus understood is a help or a hindrance to genuine scientific understanding. It is an open question whether we know more, or less, now that we have carved the world up into increasingly smaller pieces. More is not necessarily better. Metaphysicians cast their aspirations in terms of “carving reality at its joints.” Scientists, in their theory-building, are always in danger not only of carving at the wrong places but also, simply, of taking too many cuts. Niche theorizing and boutique marketing could well prove a serious hindrance to genuine understanding in political science, as in so many of the other social and natural sciences.

It is the job of the integrators of the profession's subdisciplines to overcome these effects, to pull all the disparate bits of knowledge back together. On the evidence of Section IV, below, it seems that they do so admirably.

III Professional Touchstones

The increasing professionalization of the profession is manifest in many ways. Perhaps the most important are the extent to which practitioners, whatever their particular specialities, share at least a minimal grounding in

broadly the same methodological techniques and in broadly the same core literature. These have been acquired in myriad ways—in postgraduate training, at Michigan or Essex summer schools, or on the job, teaching and researching. The depth and details of these common cores vary slightly, depending on country and subfield.[21] But virtually all political scientists nowadays can make tolerably good sense of regression equations, and virtually everyone is at least loosely familiar with broadly the same corpus of classics in the field.

A Classic Texts

Political science, like virtually all the other natural and social sciences, is increasingly becoming an article-based discipline. But while some classic journal articles never grow into a book, and some whole debates have been conducted on the pages of journals alone, the most lasting contributions still come predominantly in book form.[22] Almond and Verba's Civic Culture (1963), Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes' American Voter (1960), Dahl's Who Governs? (1961b), Dahrendorf's Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (1959), Deutsch's Nerves of Government (1963), Downs's Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), Easton's Systems Analysis of Political Life (1965), Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), Key's Responsible Electorate (1966), Lane's Political Ideology (1962), Lindblom's Intelligence of Democracy (1965), Lipset's Political Man (1960), Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966), Neustadt's Presidential Power (1960), Olson's Logic of Collective Action (1965): all these are the common currency of the profession, the lingua franca of our shared discipline and the touchstones for further contributions to it.[23]

One of the defining manifestations of the new professionalism within political science is the phenomenon of the "instant classic."[24] These are books which, almost immediately upon publication, come to be incorporated into the canon—books which everyone is talking about and

[21] That common methodological core might best be seen as being bracketed between Galtung (1967) and King, Keohane and Verba (1994).

[22] Marshall's In Praise of Sociology (1990) similarly virtually defines that discipline in terms of ten "classic" texts in post-war empirical (in his case, British) sociology.

[23] Just as had, a generation previously, books (to name a few) like: Duverger's Political Parties (1951/1954); Key's Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (1942) and Southern Politics (1950); Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1943); and Simon's Administrative Behavior (1951).

[24] Initially remarked upon by Brian Barry (1974), in connection with a book just outside this period—Hirschman's Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970).

presumed to know, at least in passing. Whether these instant classics will have the same staying power as those older pillars of the profession is, perhaps, an open question. One of the striking findings to emerge from an analysis of the references contained within the rest of the chapters of the New Handbook is how short a shelf-life most work in political science actually enjoys. More than three-quarters of the works cited in the New Handbook have, as Appendix 1A shows, been published in the twenty years since the 1975 publication of the old Handbook; and over 30 per cent have been published in the last five years alone.[25] Cynics may say that is a reflection of pure faddishness. Others may say, more sympathetically, that it is an inevitable reflection of the way in which the next building-block inevitably fits on the last in any cumulative discipline. Whatever the source of the phenomenon, it is transparently true that several books which were much discussed, at some particular period, have now been substantially superseded in professional discourse.[26]

Still, for conveying a quick impression of substantive developments within the discipline over the past quarter-century, we could hardly do better than simply list "great books" produced over that period which have initiated a professional feeding frenzy of just that sort. The list is long, inevitably incomplete and disputable at the margins. Like the larger profession, it is also strongly Anglophone and largely U.S.-oriented. But by almost any account, these contemporary classics would probably have to include:

- Graham Allison's Essence of Decision (1971);
- Robert Axelrod's Evolution of Co-operation (1984);
- Samuel Barnes, Max Kaase et al.'s Political Action (1979);
- Morris Fiorina's Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (1981);
- Ronald Inglehart's Silent Revolution (1977);
- James March and Johan Olsen's Rediscovering Institutions (1989);
- Elinor Ostrom's Governing the Commons (1990);

[25] The former finding might be explained by the fact that authors of the first three chapters in each section of the New Handbook have been explicitly instructed to focus on developments since the 1975 publication of the Greenstein–Polsby Handbook. (Only the authors of the last "Old and New" chapter in each section have been encouraged to range temporally further afield.) But the latter fact cannot be explained away in that fashion, and it is so continuous with the former that it seems unlikely that the former can be wholly explained away in that fashion either.

[26] Perhaps the two most conspicuous examples, within the twenty years here under review, are Lindblom's Politics and Markets (1977) and Tufte's Political Control of the Economy (1978)—both of which were much discussed toward the beginning of the period but which now figure surprisingly peripherally in the New Handbook chapters touching upon the literatures they have spawned.

- Theda Skocpol's States and Social Revolution (1979);
  Sidney Verba and Norman Nie's Participation in America (1972);

Among the much-discussed books of the past two or three years which seem set to join this list are King, Keohane and Verba's Designing Social Inquiry (1994) and Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work (1993).

B Recurring Themes

At the outset, we defined politics as the constrained use of social power. As we noted there, any novelty that that definition might claim lies in its emphasis upon constraint as a key to politics. But that novelty is not ours alone. Politics as (and the politics of) constraints has, in one way or another, been a recurring theme of political science over the past quarter-century.[27]

Running across virtually all the following chapters is, as has already been remarked upon, a renewed recognition of the importance of institutional factors in political life. With the rise of this "new institutionalism" comes a renewed appreciation of history and happenstance, rules and regimes as constraining forces in political life. Of course, it has long been a commonplace in some corners of the discipline that "history matters": for those who cut their professional teeth on Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) notions of "frozen cleavages" or Moore's (1966) developmental models of communism, fascism or parliamentary democracy or Burnham's (1970) theories of "critical realignments," there is little novelty in the thought that the coalition structure at crucial moments in the past might have shaped political life for years to come. But these new institutionalist themes are now central to the discipline as a whole, across its several subfields. Sterling examples include two contemporary classics in policy history: Skocpol's Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (1992) and Orren's Belated Feudalism: Labor, the Law and Liberal Development in the United States (1991).

The legacy of history, then, is one of the constraints to which new institutionalism points us. Another is the nested and embedded nature of social rules and regimes, practices and possibilities. In this Russian-doll model of social life, ordinary machinations occur relatively near the surface. But, to take just the most straightforward legalistic example, the rules we invoke in enacting ordinary legislation are embedded higher-order principles, rules

[27] In another sense, too, there has been increasing interest in the decreasing capacity of the state apparatus. See Rose and Peters (1978), Nordlinger (1981) and Flora (1986).

of a constitutional sort. And, as many have recently discovered, even constitution-writers do not enjoy a completely free hand: even those “highest” laws are embedded in some other even higher-order principles, rules and procedures, albeit of an extra-legal sort. The same is true of all the other practices and procedures and rules and regimes that collectively frame social life. None is free-standing: all are embedded in, defined in terms of, and work on and in relation to, a plethora of other similar practices and procedures and rules and regimes. None is ultimate: each is nested within an ever-ascending hierarchy of yet-more-fundamental, yet-more-authoritative rules and regimes and practices and procedures (North 1990; Tsebelis 1990; Easton 1990; Weingast below: chap. 5; Alt and Alesina below: chap. 28; cf. Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963).

Standing behind all those nested rules and regimes, practices and procedures are, of course, socio-economic constraints of a more standard sort. Perhaps the more deeply nested aspects of social organization are as robust as they are only because they are sociologically familiar and materially productive: therein, in the final analysis, may well lie the ultimate source of their strength as constraints on the use of social power. Most of the time, however, those most deeply nested aspects of the social order exercise their influence unobtrusively, passing unnoticed and unquestioned. The ultimate sources of their strength as constraints are therefore virtually never on display (Granovetter 1985).

At other times, the use of social power is shaped and constrained by socio-economic forces that work right at the surface of social life. This may seem to be a tired old theme, reworked endlessly from the days of Marx (1852/1972b; 1871/1972a) and Beard (1913) forward. However, these themes have been powerfully formalized and elaborated in contemporary classics such as Lindblom's Politics and Markets (1977) and Tufte's Political Control of the Economy (1978). And surprisingly much remains to be said on these themes, judging from recent works such as Przeworski and Sprague's Paper Stones (1986), on the socio-economic logic limiting the prospects of electoral socialism, and Rogowski's Commerce and Coalitions (1989), grounding the structure of domestic coalitions in the terms of international trade.

The use of social power is also constrained in yet another way which has recently come to the fore across several subfields of political science. The constraints here in view are of a cognitive sort, constraints on the exercise of pure (and, more especially, practical) reason. Political sociologists and psychologists have long been sensitive to the irrational and arational aspects of political life: the workings of socialization and ideology within mass belief systems (Jennings and Niemi 1981; Converse 1964). But even

rational choice modellers are now coming to appreciate the analytic possibilities that open up when relaxing heroic assumptions of complete information and perfect rationality (Simon 1954; 1985; Bell, Raiffa and Tversky 1988; Popkin 1991; Pappi below: chap. 9, Grofman below: chap. 30). Of course, what political economists see as informational shortcuts others construe as psychological imprints, and for all sorts of purposes that difference clearly still matters. But it is the convergence that has been achieved rather than the differences that remain which, from the present perspective, seems the more remarkable. Political scientists of virtually every ilk are once again according a central role to people's beliefs and what lies behind them.

What people believe to be true and important, what they believe to be good and valuable, not only guides but also constrains their social actions (Offe below: chap. 29). Those beliefs, in turn, are framed around past teachings and past experiences. Shaping those teachings and experiences can shape people's beliefs and values and thereby their political choices (Neustadt and May 1986; Edelman 1988). The manipulation of these constraints, like the manipulation of people within those constraints, is a deeply political act meriting—and, increasingly, receiving—as much analytic attention as any other. Among notable recent contributions are Allison's (1971) work on “conceptual maps,” March's (1972) on “model bias,” Axelrod's (1976) schema theory, Jervis's (1976) on the role of perceptions in international relations, and much work in political communications (Nimmo and Sanders 1981; Swanson and Nimmo 1990; Graber 1993).

Another recurring theme in the new political science which this New Handbook maps is the increasing appreciation that ideas have consequences. The point pops up, time and again, in discussions of public policy. Getting new perspectives on old problems, seeing new ways of doing things, seeing new things to do: all these, as applied to public problems, are quintessentially political activities (Olsen 1972; Nelson below: chap. 24; Majone below: chap. 26). But the same is true cross-nationally: the spread of the idea of democratization, as well as of particular ideas for how to democratize particular sorts of regimes, was undeniably central to some of the most dramatic recent political developments worldwide (Whitehead below: chap. 14). Within international relations, too, an idealism of almost Hegelian proportions is once again rightly on the rise (Goldmann below: chap. 16; Sanders below: chap. 17; Keohane below: chap. 18). Within the framework of “politics as the constrained use of social power,” those maneuvers amount to moving or removing constraints; that makes them less obviously confrontational than other exercises of power, but exercises of power nonetheless.

Finally, there has been a virtual meltdown of the fact vs. value distinction, that old bugbear of the behavioral revolution in its most insistently positivist phase. There are meta-theoretical reasons aplenty for resisting the distinction; and insofar as the distinction can be defensibly drawn at all, there are ethical reasons for insisting upon the primacy of values, for insisting upon a "political science with a point" (Goodin 1980; 1982). But what eventually proved compelling was the simple recognition that political agents themselves are ethical actors, too (Taylor 1967; 1985). They internalize values and act upon them; and occasionally they find themselves persuaded (occasionally, perhaps, even by academic political philosophers) to internalize other, better values.

If we want to understand such people's behavior, we must incorporate values into our analysis—both the values that they actually have, and the ones that they might come to have. Thus, James Scott's Moral Economy of the Peasant (1976) explains peasant rebellions in Southeast Asia to perplexed policy-makers in simple terms of people's reactions against policies they perceive to be unjust, according to conventional local understandings of what justice requires; and Barrington Moore's Injustice (1978) aspires to generalize the proposition. The spread of the democratic ideal across southern Europe, then Latin America, then eastern Europe might similarly be seen as political action inspired by a vision of what was good, combined with a vision of what was possible (Dalton below: chap. 13; Whitehead below: chap. 14). Trying to disentangle facts and values in the mental processes and political dynamics underlying these developments would be pure folly.

Similarly, political scientists find themselves increasingly wanting to employ complex research designs systematically relating structures, processes and outcomes. To do so, they need a theoretical framework which can straddle and integrate all these levels of analysis. Therein arguably lies the great power of rational choice analysis and new institutionalism; and that, in turn, may go some way toward explaining the predominance of those intellectual agendas across contemporary political science as a whole (see Section IV below). At the same time, however, those complex research designs also aspire to the normative evaluation of structures, processes and outcomes, and in so doing they integrate normative political philosophy into their designs in ways that would have been an anathema to previous generations. Therein arguably lies the explanation for the prevalence of Rawls's works on justice (1971; 1993), among the most commonly referenced books, and for the presence of normative theorists like Barry, Dahl and Rawls among the most the most frequently referenced and important integrators of the discipline (see Appendices 1C, 1D and 1E).

C New Voices

We have learned, from feminists, deconstructionists and postmodernists more generally, to be attentive to "silences"—to what is left out and what goes unsaid. When surveying a whole discipline, trying to think what is not there but should be is always a daunting task.

Certainly it is true enough that whole subfields wax and wane. Of late, there has been rather less public law and rather less public administration finding its way into mainstream political science than once was the case (Wildavsky 1964; 1979; Wilson 1973)—although there is evidence that that is now changing, once again (Drewry below: chap. 6; Peters below: chap. 7; Peters and Wright below: chap. 27). Certain once-prominent subfields are thinly represented in the New Handbook—as perhaps they are, too, in the recent history of the profession which contributors have been asked to track. Commentators on public policy in general nowadays find far fewer occasions than once they would have done to reflect upon urban politics (Banfield and Wilson 1963; Banfield 1970; Katznelson 1981); commentators on international relations say less nowadays than they would have done, only a few years ago, about strategic studies (Schelling 1960; Freedman 1981); writers on institutions say rather little nowadays about the once-thriving field of representation (Eulau and Wahlke 1978; Fenno 1978); and writers on behavior say rather less than once they would have done about political influence (Banfield 1961), political communication and political participation more generally (cf. Pappi below: chap. 9; Dalton below: chap. 13; Grofman below: chap. 30; and McGraw below: chap. 34). Finally, there has always been too little attention paid, within the Anglo-centric political science mainstream, to Marxian theories and foreign-language sources—although, again, there is evidence that that, too, is now changing (Whitehead below: chap. 14; Apter below: chap. 15; von Beyme below: chap. 22; Offe below: chap. 29).

Among the most notable new voices clearly represented in political science today, compared to a quarter-century ago, are those of postmodernists and of feminists themselves. Not only is there now a large literature on the distinctive roles played by women in politics (Nelson and Chowdhury 1994); there is now a distinctively feminine voice to be heard, particularly in political theory (Pateman 1988; Shanley and Pateman 1991; Young below: chap. 20), international relations (Tickner below: chap. 18) and public policy (Nelson below: chap. 24).

Postmodernism more generally has made rather more modest inroads, in part because its central precepts are cast on such a high theoretical plane (White 1991). Political theorists, however, have certainly shown an interest

(Young below: chap. 20; von Beyme below: chap. 22). Moreover, such theories prove to be a rich source of inspiration and insights for those studying the so-called "new political movements" (Dunleavy below: chap. 10; Dalton below: chap. 13; Young below: chap. 20) and the fracturing of the old international order (Tickner below: chap. 18). Wherever once there were clearly defined structures, and now there are none (or many disconnected ones), the post-structural theoretical arsenal may well offer insights into how that happened and why.

Whether fully postmodern, contemporary political science is decidedly substantially post-positivist, in that it certainly has taken lessons of the hermeneutic critique substantially on board. Subjective aspects of political life, the internal mental life of political actors, meanings and beliefs and intentions and values—all these are now central to political analysis across the board (Edelman 1964; 1988; Scott 1976; Riker 1986; Popkin 1991; Kaase, Newton and Scarbrough 1995). These developments are much in evidence throughout the New Handbook.[28]

Political methodology, more generally, seems to be entering something of a postmodern phase. Perhaps few methodologists would embrace that self-description quite so enthusiastically as Alker (below: chap. 35). Many now do, however, emphasize the need for contextualized and path-dependent explanations (Jackson below: chap. 32; Ragin et al. below: chap. 33). That, in turn, represents something of a retreat away from generality and toward particularity, away from universality and toward situatedness, in the explanatory accounts we offer for political phenomena. In that sense, these recent developments in political methodology might be seen as a "postmodern turn."

Indeed, treating the history of the discipline as a whole as our "text," postmodern techniques might help us see many possible narratives in our collective past—and correspondingly many possible paths open for future development (Dryzek, Farr and Leonard 1995). Those fixated on a "big science" vision of linear progress might be disappointed by that prospect of development along disparate trajectories.[29] But on Dogan's (below: chap. 3) account of progress within the discipline, this proliferation of "new breeds" among political scientists is to be greatly welcomed for the fruitful possibilities for hybridization that it creates.

[28] Weingast below: chap. 5; Pappi below: chap. 9; Dunleavy below: chap. 10; Whitehead below: chap. 14; Tickner below: chap. 18; von Beyme below: chap. 21; Hofferbert and Cingranelli below: chap. 25; Majone below: chap. 26; Offe below: chap. 29; Grofman below: chap. 30; Alker below: chap. 35.

[29] As is clearly revealed by looking at the disparate paths of development of political science within different national communities. Compare the U.S. story, as classically related by Somit and Tanenhaus (1967), with the stories contained in, for example: Easton, Gunnell and Graziano 1991; Wagner, Wittrock and Whitley 1991; Dierkes and Biervert 1992; Rokkan 1979; and Chester 1986.

IV The Shape of the Profession: A Bibliometric Analysis

Perhaps the best way to substantiate these broader claims about the nature of the discipline, as revealed in the New Handbook, is through a closer bibliometric analysis of the references contained herein. The conventional style of bibliometric analysis counts how frequently works or, more commonly, works by particular authors are cited. Albeit inevitably flawed in various respects, these are nonetheless useful measures for all sorts of purposes: for gauging the reputation and standing of individuals and departments within the profession, for assessing the intensity of use of any particular piece or type of work or of works by any particular individual, and so on.[30]

What is of more interest in the present context, however, is the penetration of works by members of one subdiscipline into other subdisciplines, and the resulting integration across the discipline provided by those authors and works. For those purposes, we have preferred to concentrate, not on counts of the number of times authors or pieces of work are cited in the body of the text, but rather on the number of times authors or pieces of work are cited in the reference lists of the other chapters of the New Handbook. (To avoid biasing the results, these counts systematically exclude references in our own reference list at the end of this chapter.[31]) This approach, while not without its distortions, seems to be the most appropriate to our task.[32]

Various things emerge relatively clearly from the resulting bibliometric counts. The first is that the vast majority of political scientists are specialists contributing primarily to their own subdisciplines. A great majority of the authors and works mentioned at all are found in the reference lists of only one subdisciplinary section of the New Handbook. Indeed (as Appendix 1B

[30] For assessments of U.S.-based individuals and U.S. departments along these lines, see Klingemann (1986). More recent data are available from Klingemann upon request.

[31] We do so to avoid "cooking the books" in favor of the generalizations we hope to establish through our own pattern of referencing. We have also, as is conventional, excluded all self-references from our counts (which imposes a greater hardship than usual on New Handbook contributors, since they are in effect excluded from a quarter of the chapters in which their own names would most naturally appear, whoever was writing them). We have counted all co-authors equal and in full (i.e., as if each of them were the author of a single-authored work); although less conventional, that seemed more appropriate given our focus upon assessing authors as potential integrators rather than upon apportioning credit to reputations.

[32] Most notably, counting the number of times an author appears in reference lists, rather than counting citations in the text of the chapters, introduces a bias against Berlin's (1953) "hedgehogs" (who know one big thing—or have written one big book) and in favor of his "foxes" (who know many little things—or have written many books or articles to which people refer).

shows) almost two-thirds of authors are mentioned only once, in a single chapter's reference list.[33]

At the other extreme, a handful of scholars reappear frequently in New Handbook chapters' reference lists. Some thirty-five authors (listed in Appendix 1C) are mentioned more than ten times in various chapters' reference lists. No particular importance should be attached to anyone's precise standing in the resulting league of honor: we are dealing with a small sample, here, in looking across only thirty-four chapters' reference lists. While exact rankings within this list may therefore be imprecise, and the membership of the list itself somewhat unreliable at the margins, in broad outline this list seems to have both surface plausibility and broad reliability as an indicator of whose work is of broad interest across several subfields of the discipline.

Inspection of the names on that list—and of the most frequently referenced books (Appendix 1D), more especially—reveals with remarkable clarity the intellectual agendas currently dominating the political science community as a whole. We see quite strikingly the residues of the "two revolutions," first the behavioral revolution and then the rational choice one, on the contemporary profession. Looking at the list of most widely referenced books, the old classics of the behavioral revolution—Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes's American Voter; Almond and Verba's Civic Culture; Lipset and Rokkan's Party Systems and Voter Alignments—are still there, albeit in the lower tiers. But sweeping all three top tiers are the classics of the subsequent rational choice revolution: Downs's Economic Theory of Democracy and Olson's Logic of Collective Action, joined recently by Ostrom's Governing the Commons. The rational choice putsch has been remarkably successful, not so much in pushing out the old behavioral orthodoxy, as in carving out a predominant role for itself alongside it.[34] That the residue of the older revolution is still so strongly in evidence is in itself an impressive fact about the discipline. Cynics say that scientific revolutions are simply the product of fad and fashion. If so, we would expect one fad to disappear completely when another takes over. However, that clearly has not happened. Whether knowledge is strictly cumulative is, perhaps,

[33] A dispiriting interpretation of this result, together with that in Appendix 1A, is that most scholars make minor contributions which will be soon forgotten. Remember, though, that the New Handbook is a highly selective survey of major contributions over the past two decades; having made a contribution meriting mention there is in itself a major accomplishment, and in those terms it is an encouraging sign that there are so many scholars working at the many cutting edges of our discipline.

[34] Barry's Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (1970/1978), written at the cusp of this change, subjects both to a merciless logical critique; he remarks, in the preface to the 1978 edition, upon the remarkable waning of the "sociological" (behavioral) paradigm over the intervening eight years.

another issue. But at least the older insights have not been lost as new ones are added, in successive revolutions within political science.

Inspecting those same tables, we also see the growing evidence of the next revolution on its way: the "new institutionalist" movement. That movement is partly in league with the rational choice movement—an alliance represented, among most frequently referenced books, by Ostrom's Governing the Commons and North's Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. In other authors' hands, new institutionalism takes on a decidedly sociological and anti-rational choice cast. This strand is represented, among most frequently referenced books by March and Olsen's Rediscovering Institutions and Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions. Admitting as it does of either interpretation—and of both at once—new institutionalism thus has great power to provide an integrative framework for the sorts of complex research designs discussed above.

The next step in our bibliometric profile of the profession is to search among those frequently-referenced members of the discipline for "integrators" of the discipline as a whole. We define as an "integrator" anyone who appears at least once in the reference lists in more than half (that is, five or more) of the eight subdisciplinary parts of the New Handbook. Of the 1630 authors represented in the New Handbook's references, only seventy-two (4.4 percent) appear in five or more chapters. Of those, only twenty-one constitute "integrators" of the discipline as a whole—in the sense that their influence spreads across more than half the subdisciplinary parts of the New Handbook. These twenty-one "integrators" are listed in Appendix 1E.[35]

Using much the same techniques, we see how well each subdiscipline itself is integrated into the larger discipline. Here we focus on each subdiscipline's first three tiers of most frequently referenced authors (these are listed in Appendix 1F). To see how well the subdiscipline is integrated into the larger discipline, we then ask (in Appendix 1G) two questions. To what extent are that subdiscipline's most frequently referenced authors also the most frequently referenced in the discipline as a whole (defined as being among its first ten tiers of most frequently referenced)? And to what extent are that subdiscipline's most frequently referenced authors among the integrators of the discipline as a whole?

Two subdisciplines (Comparative Politics and Political Economy) are, on both measures, particularly well-integrated into the profession as a whole. There are other subdisciplines (Public Policy and Administration and Political Theory) whose own most referenced authors serve as integrators

[35] Having only twenty-one integrators among the hundreds of scholars currently active may make political science seem like a relatively unintegrated enterprise. Conversely, having an entire discipline fix its collective focus on so few individuals and their work might make for more integration.

for the discipline as a whole, while there are others (notably, Political Institutions) which largely lack integrators but whose own most frequently referenced authors are among the most frequently referenced within the discipline as a whole. There is one other subdiscipline (Political Methodology) whose own most frequently referenced authors figure neither among the larger discipline's integrators nor among its most-frequently-referenced. This latter subdiscipline seems to stand substantially outside and to develop relatively independently of the larger discipline.[36]

A good composite view of the shape of the discipline emerges from combining all these criteria: who are the “integrators” of the profession, who are “most frequently referenced in the discipline as a whole,” and who are “most frequently referenced within their own subdisciplines.” As Appendix 1H shows, there are some ten key scholars—“powerhouses” of the discipline, we call them—who score highly on all three criteria. These ten individuals (listed as “group 1” in Table A1.H) are among the “most frequently referenced” authors, both within the discipline as a whole and within their respective subdisciplines; and, at the same time, they are integrators of the discipline as a whole. Another twenty-eight scholars (groups 2–5 in Table A1.H) play one or the other of those discipline-wide roles, with yet another thirty-nine playing similarly key roles within subdisciplines alone.

The general pattern is clear enough: there are highly differentiated sub-disciplinary communities making great advances. But there is also a small band of scholars at the peak of the profession who genuinely do straddle many (in a few cases, most) of those subdisciplinary communities and integrate them into one coherent disciplinary whole.

V Conclusion

The picture that emerges from this analysis, and from the remaining thirty-four chapters of the New Handbook upon which it is based, is a happy one of a fractious discipline of bright and enterprising scholars constantly looking over the fences that used to separate subdisciplines. The old aspiration of a Unified Science might still remain a chimera (Neurath, Carnap and Morris 1955). But at the turn of the century, ours looks to be at least a potentially unifiable science. The intellectual energy, curiosity and openness that has been required to carry us even that far is, in itself, surely something to celebrate.

[36] What we cannot analyze using these data are relations between the subdisciplines of political science and other disciplines. On these connections, see Dogan (below: chap. 3).

Appendix 1A

The Continuing Impact of Works in Political Science

How much continuing impact is any given work in political science likely to have? To answer this question, we have categorized publications in all the reference lists of all the chapters in the New Handbook according to their year of original publication. The results are shown in Table A1.A.

Table A1.A Publication Years of References

Year	Number	Percent	Cumulative Percent
pre-1900	22	0.6	0.6
1900–20	11	0.3	1.0
1921–40	59	1.7	2.7
1941–50	45	1.3	4.0
1951–60	155	4.6	8.6
1961–65	147	4.3	12.9
1966–70	165	4.8	17.7
1971–75	214	6.3	24.0
1976–80	320	9.4	33.4
1981–85	441	13.0	46.4
1986–90	792	23.3	69.7
1991–95	1032	30.3	100.0
Total	3403		

The upshot of this analysis is that more than half of the works mentioned in the New Handbook have been published in the last decade, and two-thirds having been published in the last two decades. Less than one-tenth were published before the publication of the American Voter (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960).

Appendix 1B

Frequency of Appearances of Authors Reference Lists

All in all, there are some 1630 authors mentioned in the reference lists of chapters 2 through 35 of the New Handbook. As is standard practice in such analyses, we exclude self-references. We also omit our own reference list (chapter 1) from this analysis, to avoid biasing the results of the analysis in favor of the propositions we hope to prove through our own pattern of referencing. In cases of multiple authorship, each author was counted as if the author of single-authored work.

The total number of references, thus defined, is 3341. The mean number of times an author is referenced in these lists is 2.1. However, the variance is large (5.8) and the distribution is skewed (3.9). Thus, it makes more sense to take the median as a descriptor of the distribution: the median is 1. And this is what a look at Table A1.B clearly shows. The vast majority of the authors (1063 = 65.2 percent) are referenced only once.

In our analysis we are interested in differentiation and integration of the discipline, which we have divided in this New Handbook into eight subdisciplines. Put in that context, this finding points to differentiation: almost two-thirds of the authors, appearing as they do in only one chapter's reference list, must perforce have been cited in only one of the subdisciplinary parts of the New Handbook. Other authors are cited more frequently, some much more frequently. These are further analyzed in the Appendices that follow.

Table A1.B Frequency of References

Number of references	Number of authors	Percent
1	1063	65.2
2	266	16.3
3	93	5.7
4	55	3.4
5	52	3.2
6	23	1.4
7	14	0.9
8	12	0.7
9	10	0.6
10	7	0.4
11	10	0.6
12	4	0.2
13	5	0.3
14	2	0.1
15	3	0.2
16	3	0.2
17	2	0.1
18	3	0.2
19	2	0.1
25	1	0.1
Total	1630	100

Appendix 1C

Most Frequently Referenced Authors Across the Discipline

Authors who are referenced frequently have the potential for integrating the subfields of the discipline. We define the "most frequently referenced authors" as those who occupy the first ten tiers in the number appearance in reference lists in chapters 2 through 35 of the New Handbook. That cut-off point gives us the thirty-five authors (2.1 percent of all authors referenced) listed in Table A1.C.

While frequently referenced authors might integrate the discipline, it is also possible that frequently referenced authors may be referenced mostly in their own specific subfield of the discipline. In that case, the frequency of references to that author would not be counted as evidence of integration but rather of differentiation. In order to investigate that dimension, we have to look at the most frequently referenced authors subdiscipline by subdiscipline (see Appendix 1F).

Table A1.C Most Frequently Referenced Authors, Discipline-Wide

Tier	Authors	Number of times appearing in reference lists
1	Verba, S.	25
2	Lipset, S.M.	19
	Shepsle, K.	
3	Almond, G.	18
	Dahl, R.	
	Riker, W.	
4	Lijphart, A.	17
	Skocpol, T.	
5	Keohane, R.	16
	McCubbins, M.	
	Weingast, B.	
6	March, J.	15
	North, D.	
	Ostrom, E.	
7	Elster, J.	14
	Inglehart, R.	
8	Barry, B.	13
	Downs, A.	
	Olson, M.	
	Przeworski, A.	
	Simon, H.	
9	Converse, P.	12
	Fiorina, M.	
	Ferejohn, J.	
	Schmitter, P.	
10	Buchanan, J.	11
	Easton, D.	
	Lasswell, H.	
	Moe, T.	
	Olsen, J.	
	Ordeshook, P.	
	Rawls, J.	
	Rokkan, S.	
	Sartori, G.	
	Wildavsky, A.	

Appendix 1D

Most Frequently Referenced Books

Table A1.D shows the books appearing most frequently in reference lists in chapters in the New Handbook.

Table A1.D Most Frequently Referenced Books

Tier	No. of refs.	Author	Title	Date of pub.
1	11	Anthony Downs	*An Economic Theory of Democracy*	1957
2	9	Mancur Olson	*The Logic of Collective Action*	1965
3	8	Elinor Ostrom	*Governing the Commons*	1990
4	7	Douglass North	*Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*	1990
5	6	Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba	*The Civic Culture*	1963
		Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald Stokes	*The American Voter*	1960
		James G. March and Johan P. Olsen	*Rediscovering Institutions*	1989
		John Rawls	*A Theory of Justice*	1971
6	5	Brian Barry	*Sociologists, Economists and Democracy*	1970/1978
		Morris P. Fiorina	*Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*	1981
		Seymour Martin	*Party Systems and Voter*	1967
		Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds.	*Alignments*	
		John Rawls	*Political Liberalism*	1993
		William Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook	*An Introduction to Positive Political Theory*	1973
		Theda Skocpol	*States and Social Revolutions*	1979

Appendix 1E

The Integrators

Who are the integrators? In order to answer this question we have looked at all authors who have had at least five references. Given our division of the world of political science into eight substantive subfields, these authors might in principle be present in more than half of the subfields distinguished (one reference in five parts of the New Handbook). Our starting-point, then, is with the seventy-two authors who appear in reference lists of at least five chapters; they make up 4.4 percent of the 1630 authors.

We define an "integrator" as an author who is to be found at least once in the reference sections of more than half of the eight subfields (that is in five or more of them). Out of the total of 1630 authors twenty-one (or 1.3 percent) qualify as integrators. Their names are listed in Table A1.E.

Table A1.E Integrators of the Profession

Number of parts in which they appear	*Author*	*Appears in parts*							
		2	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*
8	Ostrom, E.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
6	Barry, B.	x	x	x	x	x		x	
	Downs, A.		x	x		x	x	x	x
	March, J.	x	x	x	x		x	x	
	Olson, M.	x	x	x		x	x	x	
5	Almond, G.	x	x	x				x	x
	Dahl, R.	x	x	x		x			x
	Erikson, R.		x	x			x	x	x
	Laver, M.	x	x	x		x		x	
	Lijphart, A.	x	x	x		x			x
	Lipset, S. M.	x	x	x			x		x
	Olsen, J.	x		x	x		x	x	
	Ordes-hook, P.	x				x	x	x	x
	Polsby, N.	x			x	x	x		x
	Riker, W.	x				x	x	x	x
	Scharpf, F.	x		x		x	x	x	
	Shepsle, K.	x		x		x	x	x	
	Simon, H.	x	x			x	x	x	
	Skocpol, T.	x		x		x	x		x
	Verba, S.		x	x	x	x			x
	Weingast, B.	x		x	x		x	x	

Appendix 1F

Most Frequently Referenced Authors, by Subdiscipline

The rank-order of most frequently referenced authors contained in Appendix 1C might reflect either strong prominence in one of the subfields (differentiation) or across subfields (integration) or both. In order to sort out that issue, we look next at the top three ranks for the subfields.

Who, then, dominates the subdisciplines? We define the group of authors who are prominent in any particular subfield as those among the top three tiers of most frequently referenced within the part of the New Handbook devoted to that subfield. By this criterion, we find that fifty-nine authors (3.6 percent of the total authors referenced) are prominent in one—or, in the case of three authors, more (McCubbins, Sects. II and VIII; Stokes, Sects. III and VII; Verba, Sects. I and IV)—subfields. They are listed in Table A1.F below.

Table A1.F Most Frequently Referenced Authors, by Subdiscipline

Tiers	*Authors*	*Number of times referenced*
Part I	**The Discipline**	
1	Dahl, R.	10
2	Lipset, S.	9
	Verba, S.	
3	Lasswell, H.	
Part II	**Political Institutions**	
1	North, D.	9
2	Elster, J.	8
	McCubbins, M.	
3	Ferejohn, J.	7
Part III	**Political Behavior**	
1	Converse, P.	9
	Sprague, J.	
2	Campbell, A.	6
	Sniderman, P.	
	Stokes, D.	
3	Heath, A.	5
	Miller, W.	
Part IV	**Comparative Politics**	
1	Almond, G.	11
2	Verba, S.	8
3	Inglehart, R.	7
	Lijphart, A.	
Part V	**International Relations**	
1	Keohane, R.	10
2	Waltz, K.	8
3	Holsti, K.	5

	Krasner, S.	
Part VI	**Political Theory**	
1	Goodin, R.	6
	Habermas, J.	
	Kymlicka, W.	
2	Barry, B.	5
	Cohen, J.	
	Gutmann, A.	
	Rawls, J.	
	Taylor, C.	
3	Dowding, K.	4
	Galston, W.	
	Hardin, R.	
	Miller, D.	
	Pateman, C.	
	Walzer, M.	
Part VII	**Public Policy and Administration**	
1	Lindblom, C.	5
	Wildavsky, A.	
2	Merriam, C.	4
	Skocpol, T.	
	Wilson, J. Q.	
3	Derthick, M.	3
	deLeon, P.	
	Esping-Andersen, G.	
	Flora, P.	
	Klingemann, H.-D.	
	Lowi, T.	
	Olson, M.	
	Sharkansky, I.	
	Stokes, D.	
Part VIII	**Political Economy**	
1	Weingast, B.	10
2	McCubbins, M.	8
3	Shepsle, K.	7
Part IX	**Political Methodology**	
1	Achen, C.	6
	King, G.	
2	Beck, N.	5
	Brady, H.	
	Campbell, D.	

	Palfrey, T.R.	
3	Kinder, D.	4
	Lodge, M.	

Appendix 1G

The Integration of Subdisciplines into the Discipline

Among the fifty-nine most frequently referenced authors within subdisciplines (listed in Appendix 1F), twenty (or 34 percent) of them are among those most frequently referenced in the discipline as a whole (see Table A1.C). Nearly two-thirds of those prominent in subdisciplines are prominent predominantly in those subfields, which constitutes a measure of differentiation within the discipline as a whole. This point is underscored by the fact that only ten (or 17 percent) of the fifty-nine most frequently referenced authors within subdisciplines are also among the twenty-one integrators of the discipline as a whole listed in Appendix 1E. A more detailed picture is given in Table A1.G.

Looking at this result from the perspective of differentiation and integration, it seems that Political Behavior, International Relations, Political Theory, Public Policy and Administration, and Political Methodology in particular are subfields with quite a lot of independent development. Relatively few of those subfields' most frequently referenced authors figure among the most frequently referenced authors of the discipline as a whole (Appendix 1C), and relatively few of them are among the integrators of the discipline as a whole (Appendix 1E).

Table A1.G Integration of Subdisciplines into the Discipline

Part		Column 1 number of most frequently referenced authors within the subdiscipline	Column 2 number of col. 1 who are also most frequently referenced within the discipline as a whole	Column 3 number of col. 1 who are also disciplinary integrators
I	Discipline	4	4	3 (Dahl, Lipset, Verba)
II	Political Institutions	4	4	0
III	Political Behaviour	7	1	0
IV	Comparative Politics	4	4	3 (Almond, Lijphart, Verba)
V	International Relations	4	1	0
VI	Political Theory	14	2	1 (Barry)
VII	Public Policy and Administration	14	3	2 (Skocpol, Olson)
VIII	Political Economy	3	3	2 (Weingast, Shepsle)
IX	Political Methodology	8	0	0
Subtotal		62	22	11
Less repeated names		–3	–2	–1
Total		59	20	10
%		100	33	17

Appendix 1H

Summary of Leading Figures in the Discipline

Table A1.H is a summary of results from Appendices C through G and combines three types of information.

- Column 1 addresses the question, "Is the author among the most frequently referenced in the discipline as a whole?" Scholars listed in Appendix 1C get an x in that column for being "prominent in the discipline."
- Column 2 addresses the question, "Is the author among the most frequently referenced in one or more of the eight subdisciplinary parts of the New Handbook?" Scholars listed in Appendix 1F get an x in that column for being "prominent in their subdisciplines."
- Column 3 addresses the question, "Is the author an integrator within the discipline as a whole?" Scholars listed in Appendix 1E get an x in that column for being "integrators."

Table A1.H Leading Figures in Political Science

Group 1

The "powerhouses" are those authors who are integrators and who are also among the most frequently referenced both across the discipline as a whole and within one or more of its subdisciplines. According to these criteria we find ten (0.6 percent) powerhouses. These are:

	Prominent in:		
	Discipline	Subdiscipline	Integrator
Almond, G.	x	x	x
Barry, B.	x	x	x
Dahl, R.	x	x	x
Lijphart, A.	x	x	x
Lipset, S. M.	x	x	x
Olson, M.	x	x	x
Shepsle, K.	x	x	x
Skocpol, T.	x	x	x
Weingast, B.	x	x	x
Verba, S.	x	x	x

Group 2

The next group are the "highly visible integrators." These are defined as integrators who are among the most frequently referenced across the discipline as a whole but not in any particular subfield. There are seven (0.4 percent) highly visible integrators. These are:

	Prominent in discipline	Integrator
Downs, A.	x	x
March, J.	x	x
Olsen, J.	x	x
Ordeshook, P.	x	x
Ostrom, E.	x	x
Riker, W.	x	x
Simon, H.	x	x

Group 3

There are four (0.2 percent) integrators with a lower degree of visibility, meaning that they qualify as integrators but are not among the most frequently referenced either across the discipline as a whole or within any particular subfield. These are:

	Integrator
Erikson, R.	x
Laver, M.	x
Polsby, N.	x
Scharpf, F.	x

Group 4

The first three groups exhaust the "integrators." Next we come to a group of "generally prominent subfield representatives," defined as those who are among the most frequently referenced both across the discipline as a whole and within their own subfields. We have ten (0.6 percent) such scholars:

	Prominent in: Discipline	*Subdiscipline*
Converse, P.	x	x
Elster, J.	x	x
Ferejohn, J.	x	x
Inglehart, R.	x	x
Keohane, R.	x	x
Lasswell, H.	x	x
McCubbins, M.	x	x
North, D.	x	x
Rawls, J.	x	x
Wildavsky, A.	x	x

Group 5

Another seven (0.4 percent) authors are just "generally prominent." That is, they are among the most frequently referenced in the discipline overall but neither among the most frequently referenced within any particular subfield nor among the integrators. These are:

	Prominent in discipline
Buchanan, J.	x
Easton, D.	x
Fiorina, M.	x
Moe, T.	x
Rokkan, S.	x
Sartori, G.	x
Schmitter, P.	x

Group 6

Groups 1–5 exhaust those who are integrators of the discipline or who are most frequently referenced across the discipline as a whole. Finally, we have a group of authors who are among the most frequently referenced within their own subfields but do not qualify according to the two other criteria. They may be called the "special subfield representatives." There are thirty-nine (2.4 percent) authors of this type. They are:

	Prominent in subdiscipline
Achen, C.	x
Beck, N.	x
Brady, H.	x
Campbell, A.	x

Campbell, D.	x
Cohen, J.	x
deLeon, P.	x
Derthick, M.	x
Dowding, K.	x
Esping-Andersen, G.	x
Flora, P.	x
Galston, W.	x
Goodin, R.	x
Gutmann, A.	x
Habermas, J.	x
Hardin, R.	x
Heath, A.	x
Holsti, O.	x
Kinder, D.	x
King, G.	x
Klingemann, H.-D.	x
Krasner, S.	x
Kymlicka, W.	x
Lindblom, C.	x
Lodge, M.	x
Lowi, T.	x
Merriam, C.	x
Miller, D.	x
Miller, W.	x
Palfrey, T.	x
Pateman, C.	x
Rawls, J.	x
Sharkansky, I.	x
Skocpol, T.	x
Sniderman, P.	x
Stokes, D.	x
Sprague, J.	x
Taylor, C.	x
Walzer, M.	x
Waltz, K.	x
Wilson, J. Q.	x

Group 7

The seventy-six (4.7 percent) scholars in groups 1–6 above exhaust the list of those who, by our criteria, count as integrators of the discipline as a whole or the most frequently referenced authors either across the discipline as a whole or within any particular subfield of it. There are another 1523 authors referenced in the *New Handbook* whose contributions to the discipline are sufficiently substantial as to merit notice in what is, in and of itself, a very selective list.

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to Frank Castles, Mattei Dogan, John Dryzek, Dieter Fuchs, Richard I. Hofferbert, Giandomenico Majone and to a seminar of Research Unit III of the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, more generally, for comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. We are especially grateful to Nicolas Schleyer for assistance with the bibliometric research discussed in Sect. IV and the Appendices.

References

Allison, G. T. 1971. Essence of Decision. Boston: Little, Brown.
Almond, G. A. 1990. A Discipline Divided. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage.
—— and Genco, S. J. 1977. Clocks, clouds and the study of politics. World Politics, 29: 489–522.
—— and Verba, S. 1963. The Civic Culture. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
APSA (American Political Science Association). 1991. A Guide to Professional Ethics in Political Science. 2nd edn. Washington, D.C.: APSA.
Axelrod, R., 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
—— ed. 1976. The Structure of Decision. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M. S. 1963. Decisions and non-decisions: an analytic framework. American Political Science Review, 57: 632–42.
Banfield, E. C. 1961. Political Influence. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
—— 1970. The Unheavenly City. Boston: Little, Brown.
—— and Wilson, J. Q. 1963. City Politics. New York: Vintage.
Barnes, S.; Kaase, M.; et al. 1979. Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.
Barry, B. 1974. Review article: exit, voice and loyalty. British Journal of Political Science, 4: 79–107. Reprinted in Barry 1989: 186–221.
—— 1978. Sociologists, Economists and Democracy. 2nd edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; originally published 1970.
—— 1989. Democracy, Power and Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Beard, C. A. 1913. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. New York: Macmillan.
Bell, D. E.; Raiffa, H.; and Tversky, A., eds. 1988. Decision Making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Berger, P. L. 1963. Invitation to Sociology. New York: Doubleday.
Berlin, I. 1953. The Hedgehog and the Fox. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Braybrooke, D., and Lindblom, C. E. 1963. A Strategy of Decision. New York: Free Press.
Burnham, W. D. 1970. Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics. New York: Norton.
Campbell, A.; Converse, P. E.; Miller, W.; and Stokes, D. 1960. The American Voter. New York: Wiley.
Chester, N. 1986. Economics, Politics and Social Studies in Oxford, 1900–85. London: Macmillan.
Converse, P. E. 1964. The nature of belief systems in mass publics. Pp. 206–61 in Ideology and Discontent, ed. D. E. Apter. New York: Free Press.
Cornford, F. M. 1908. Microcosmographia Academia. Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes.
Crick, B. 1962. In Defence of Politics. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
Dahl, R. A. 1957. The concept of power. Behavioral Science, 2: 201–15.

—— 1961a. The behavioral approach in political science: epitaph for a monument to a successful protest. American Political Science Review, 55: 763–72.
—— 1961b. Who Governs? New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
—— 1963. Modern Political Analysis. 3rd edn. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Dahrendorf, R. 1959. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Deutsch, K. 1963. The Nerves of Government. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
Dierkes, M., and Biervert, B., eds. 1992. European Social Science in Transition. Frankfurt am Main/Boulder, Colo.: Campus Verlag/Westview.
Downs, A. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper.
Dryzek, J.; Farr, J.; and Leonard, S., eds. 1995. Political Science in History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Duverger, M. 1954. Political Parties, trans. B. and R. North. London: Methuen; originally published 1951.
—— 1966. The Idea of Politics: The Uses of Power in Society, trans. R. North and R. Murphy. London: Methuen; originally published 1964.
Easton, D. 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley.
—— 1969. The new revolution in political science. American Political Science Review, 63: 1051–61.
—— 1990. The Analysis of Political Structure. New York: Routledge.
—— Gunnell, J. G.; and Graziano, L., eds. 1991. The Development of Political Science: A Comparative Survey. London: Routledge.
—— and Schelling, C., eds. 1991. Divided Knowledge. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage.
Edelman, M. 1964. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
—— 1988. Constructing the Political Spectacle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Elster, J. 1983. Explaining Technical Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—— 1989. Nuts and Bolts for the Social Scientist. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Eulau, H., and Wahlke, J. C., et al. 1978. The Politics of Representation. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.
Fenno, R. 1978. Home Style. Boston: Little, Brown.
Ferejohn, J. A. 1974. Pork Barrel Politics. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Fiorina, M. P. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
—— 1989. Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment. 2nd edn. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
—— 1995. Rational choice, empirical contributions and the scientific enterprise. Critical Review, 9: 85–94.
Flora, P., ed. 1986. Growth to Limits. 4 vols. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Foucault, M. 1977. Discipline and Punish, trans. A. Sheridan. Harmondsworth, Mddx.: Allen Lane.
Freedman, L. 1981. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. London: Macmillan.
Galtung, J. 1967. Theory and Methods of Social Research. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Goodin, R. E. 1976. Possessive individualism again. Political Studies, 24: 488–501.
—— 1980. Manipulatory Politics. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
—— 1982. Political Theory and Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Graber, Doris. 1993. Political communication: scope, progress, promise. Pp. 305–34 in Political Science: The State of the Discipline, II, ed. A. Finifter. Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association.
Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91: 481–510.

Greenstein, F. I., and Polsby, N. W., eds. 1975. Handbook of Political Science. 8 vols. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
Hart, H. L. A. 1961. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hirschman, A. O. 1970. Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Hollis, M. 1977. Models of Man. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hughes, E. C. 1958. Men and their Work. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
Huntington, S. P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press.
Inglehart, R. 1977. The Silent Revolution. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Jennings, M. K., and Niemi, R. G. 1981. Generations and Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Jervis, R. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Johnson, N. 1989. The Limits of Political Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Jouvenel, B. de. 1948. On Power, trans. J. F. Huntington. London: Hutchinson; originally published 1945.
Kaase, M.; Newton, K.; and Scarbrough, E., eds. 1995. Beliefs in Government. 5 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Katznelson, I. 1981. City Trenches. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Key, V. O. Jr. 1942. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups. New York: Crowell.
—— 1950. Southern Politics in State and Nation. New York: Knopf.
—— 1966. The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936–1960. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Kiewiet, D. R. 1983. Micropolitics and Macroeconomics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
King, G.; Keohane, R. D.; and Verba, S. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Klingemann, H.-D. 1986. Ranking the graduate departments in the 1980s: toward objective qualitative indicators. PS, 29: 651–61.
Laclau, E., and Mouffe, C. 1985. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. London: Verso.
Lane, R. E. 1962. Political Ideology. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
Lasswell, H. D. 1950. Politics: Who Gets What, When, How? New York: P. Smith.
—— and Kaplan, A. 1950. Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Lindblom, C. E. 1965. The Intelligence of Democracy. New York: Free Press.
—— 1977. Politics and Markets. New York: Basic.
Lipset, S. M. 1960. Political Man. New York: Doubleday.
—— and Rokkan, S., eds. 1967. Party Systems and Voter Alignments. New York: Free Press.
Lowi, T. J. 1964. American business, public policy, case-studies and political theory. World Politics, 16: 676–715.
Lukes, S. 1974. Power: A Radical View. London: Macmillan.
Mansbridge, J. J., ed. 1990. Beyond Self-Interest. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
March, J. G. 1972. Model bias in social action. Review of Educational Research, 42: 413–29.
—— and Olsen, J. P. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions. New York: Free Press.
Marshall, G. 1990. In Praise of Sociology. London: Unwin Hyman.
Marx, K. 1972a. The civil war in France. Pp. 526–77 in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. R. C. Tucker. New York: Norton; originally published 1871.
—— 1972b. The eighteenth brumaire of Louis Napoleon. Pp. 436–525 in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. R. C. Tucker. New York: Norton; originally published 1871.

McCoy, C. A., and Playford, J., eds. 1968. Apolitical Politics: A Critique of Behavioralism. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.
Medawar, P. B. 1979. Advice to a Young Scientist. New York: Harper & Row.
Merton, R. K. 1936. The unintended consequences of purposive social action. American Sociological Review 1: 894–904.
—— 1973. The Sociology of Science, ed. N. W. Storer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mitchell, W. C. 1969. The shape of political theory to come: from political sociology to political economy. Pp. 101–36 in Politics and the Social Sciences, ed. S. M. Lipset. New York: Oxford University Press.
Monroe, K. R., ed. 1991. The Economic Approach to Politics. New York: HarperCollins.
Moon, J. D. 1975. The logic of political inquiry: a synthesis of opposed perspectives. In Greenstein and Polsby 1975: vol. i, pp. 131–228.
Moore, B., Jr. 1966. The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Boston: Beacon.
—— 1978. Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt. London: Macmillan.
Morriss, P. 1987. Power. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Nelson, B. J., and Chowdhury, N., eds. 1994. Women and Politics Worldwide. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Neurath, O.; Carnap, R.; and Morris, C. L., eds. 1955. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science: Foundations of the Unity of Science. 2 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Neustadt, R. E. 1960. Presidential Power. New York: Wiley.
—— and May, E. R. 1986. Thinking in Time. New York: Free Press.
Nimmo, D. D., and Sanders, K. R., eds. 1981. Handbook of Political Communication. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.
Nordlinger, E. A. 1981. On the Autonomy of the Democratic State. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
North, D. C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nozick, R. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Oakeshott, M. 1956. Political education. Pp. 1–21 in Philosophy, Politics and Society. 1st series. Oxford: Blackwell; originally delivered as an LSE Inaugural Lecture in 1951.
Olsen, J. P. 1972. Public policy-making and theories of organizational choice. Scandinavian Political Studies, 7: 45–62.
Olson, M. Jr. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Orren, K. 1991. Belated Feudalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Parsons, T. 1968. Professions. Vol. xii, pp. 536–47 in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. D. L. Sills. London: Macmillan.
Pateman, C. 1988. The Sexual Contract. Oxford: Polity.
Popkin, S. L. 1991. The Reasoning Voter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
—— et al. 1976. What have you done for me lately? American Political Science Review, 70: 779–805.
Przeworski, A., and Sprague, J. 1986. Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Putnam, R. D. 1993. Making Democracy Work. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Ranney, A., ed. 1962. Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
—— 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Ridley, F. F. 1975. Political institutions: the script not the play. Political Studies, 23: 365–80.

Riker, W. H. 1986. The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

—— and Ordeshook, P. C. 1973. An Introduction to Positive Political Theory. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Rivlin, A. M. 1971. Systematic Thinking for Social Action. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Rogowski, R. 1989. Commerce and Coalitions. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Rokkan, S., ed. 1979. A Quarter Century of International Social Science. New Delhi: Concept, for the International Social Science Council.

Rose, R., and Peters, B. G. 1978. Can Government Go Bankrupt? New York: Basic.

Russell, B. 1938. Power. London: Allen and Unwin.

Sandel, M. 1982. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. The Semi-Sovereign People. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Schelling, T. C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Schumpeter, J. A. 1943. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. London: Allen and Unwin.

Scott, J. C. 1976. The Moral Economy of the Peasant. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Sen, A. 1977. Rational fools: a critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6: 317–44.

Shanley, M. L., and Pateman, C., eds. 1991. Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory. Oxford: Polity.

Simon, H. A. 1951. Administrative Behavior. New York: Macmillan.

—— 1954. A behavioral theory of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69: 99–118.

—— 1985. Human nature is politics: the dialogue of psychology and political science. American Political Science Review, 79: 293–304.

Skocpol, T. 1979. States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

—— 1992. Protecting Soldiers and Mothers. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Somit, A., and Tanenhaus, J. 1967. The Development of American Political Science. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Stretton, H. 1969. The Political Sciences. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Swanson, D. L., and Nimmo, D., eds. 1990. New Directions in Political Communication. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage.

Taylor, C. 1967. Neutrality in political science. Pp. 25–57 in Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed. P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman. 3rd series. Oxford: Blackwell. Reprinted in Taylor 1985: vol. ii, pp. 58–90

—— 1985. Philosophical Papers. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tsebelis, G. 1990. Nested Games. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Tufte, E. R. 1978. The Political Control of the Economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Verba, S., and Nie, N. H. 1972. Participation in America. New York: Harper and Row.

Wagner, P.; Wittrock, B.; and Whitley, R., eds. 1991. Discourses on Society: The Shaping of the Social Science Disciplines. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Waldo, D. 1975. Political science: tradition, discipline, profession science, enterprise. In Greenstein and Polsby 1975: vol. i, pp. 1–130.

Weber, Max. 1946. Politics as a vocation. Pp. 77–128 in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills. New York: Oxford University Press; originally published 1919.

—— 1978. Economy and Society, ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich, trans. E. Fischoff et al. Berkeley: University of California Press; originally published 1922.
White, S. K. 1991. Political Theory and Postmodernism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wildavsky, A. 1964. Politics of the Budgetary Process. Boston: Little, Brown.
—— 1979. Speaking the Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis. Boston: Little, Brown.
Wilson, J. Q. 1973. Political Organizations. New York: Basic Books.
Wolin, S. 1960. Politics and Vision. Boston: Little, Brown.